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Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets up
a model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market together
with standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of the
economy more efﬁciently, while taking into account that its own actions inﬂuence
what it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responses
of monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bank
has to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of the
term structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomy
that is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market as
a source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United States
and Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that there
is some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve to
identify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seem
to be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is a
relatively small and open economy.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E32, E43, E52
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iiOPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH REAL-TIME
SIGNAL EXTRACTION FROM THE BOND MARKET
Kristoffer Nimark
1. Introduction
Hayek (1945) famously argued that market economies are more efﬁcient than
planned economies because of markets’ ability to efﬁciently use information
dispersed among market participants. According to Hayek, prices in competitive
markets reﬂect all information that is known to anyone and competitive markets
can potentially allocate resources more efﬁciently. In most western economies
there is now little planning and almost all prices are determined by market forces
without interference from any central authority. However, there is one important
exception: the market for short-term nominal debt where central banks borrow
and lend at ﬁxed interest rates. In the presence of nominal frictions in product
or wage markets, this practise can improve welfare by reducing the volatility of
inﬂation and output. Hayek’s insight, though formulated in a more general setting
of a planned economy, was that even a central bank that shares the objective of the
representative agent may not be able to implement an optimal stabilising policy
due to incomplete information. In this paper, the central bank would implement
an optimal stabilising policy if it knew the state of the economy with certainty,
and any deviation from optimal policy is due only to information imperfections.
Under this assumption this paper demonstrates how the central bank can make use
of Hayek’s insight and use the market for debt of longer maturities as a source
of information that makes a more efﬁcient estimation of the state of the business
cycle possible, and thus reduces deviations from optimal policy. That this is close
to how some central banks think about and use the term structure is illustrated
by a quote by the Chairman (then Governor) of the Federal Reserve Board Ben
Bernanke:
To the extent that ﬁnancial markets serve to aggregate private-sector information
about the likely future course of inﬂation, data on asset prices and yields might be
used to validate and perhaps improve the Fed’s forecasts. (Bernanke 2004)2
The suggestion that the bond market can provide information that is valuable
to policy-makers is thus not news to the policy-makers themselves. Rather, the
contribution of the present paper is to provide a coherent framework for analysing
and estimating the interaction between information contained in the term structure
andthemonetarypolicy-makingprocess.Inthemodelpresentedbelow,thecentral
bank has to set interest rates in an uncertain environment, where the yield curve
is informative about the state of the economy and thus also informative about
the desired interest rate. This has the consequence that the macroeconomy is
not independent of the term structure. The only direct effect of interest rates on
the macroeconomy is from the short rate set by the central bank to aggregate
demand, as is standard in the New-Keynesian literature. However, there is also
an indirect feedback from rates on longer-maturity bonds to the macroeconomy
through the informational content of the term structure. The mechanism is the
following. Bonds are traded daily and the afﬁne form of the bond pricing function
makes the bond pricing equation with macro factors formally equivalent to a
linear measurement of the state of the economy. The term structure can thus be
viewed as a more timely measure of the state of the economy than collected
aggregate information that is available only with delay and sometimes signiﬁcant
measurement error. A movement in the term structure can then signal a shift in
the underlying macro factors that induces the central bank to re-evaluate what the
optimal short-term interest rate should be. The shift in the term structure thus feeds
into a change in demand through the change in the short-term interest rate.
In the present model the policy-makers exploit the fact that bond market
participants’ expectations about the future are revealed by the term structure.
As pointed out by Bernanke and Woodford (1997), letting monetary policy react
mechanically to expectations may lead to a situation where expectations become
uninformative about the underlying state and no equilibrium exists. They further
argue that ‘targeting expectations’ by policy-makers cannot be a substitute to
structural modelling. In the proposed framework below, the information in the
term structure is complementary to other information and ﬁrmly connected to an
underlying structural model. Policy-makers then avoid the potential pitfalls of a
pure ‘expectations targeting’ regime.
There is a large literature concerning the information content of the term structure.
Mostly, it has focused on whether the term structure, often modelled as the
spread between short and long rates, can help predict future outcomes of macro3
variables.1 More recent work by Ang, Piazzesi and Wei (2003) suggests that
the best predictor of GDP is the short end of the yield curve. The negative
correlation between short interest rates and future output is hardly surprising,
given the evidence of the real effects of monetary policy. The conclusion of
Ang et al highlights the need to distinguish between information in the term
structure that tells us something about the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, and information that can be used by a central bank in the policy process
when the transmission mechanism is assumed to be known. This paper is solely
concerned with the latter.
There are two other potentially important types of information that could
be revealed by the term structure that the present model is silent about.
Goodfriend (1998) discusses the Federal Reserve’s responses to ‘inﬂation scares’
in the 1980s, which he deﬁnes as increases in the long-term yields. He interprets
these as doubts by market participants about the Federal Reserve’s commitment
to ﬁghting inﬂation. The present paper does not address questions about central
bank credibility, but takes a perfectly credible central bank with a publicly known
inﬂation target as given. The model presented here is also not suited to analysing
or interpreting market perceptions of the reasons for a change in the monetary
policy stance, as done by Ellingsen and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001). The policy-makers’
relative preferences for stabilising inﬂation or the output gap are assumed to be
known to bond market participants. In this paper, we restrict our attention to what
the term structure can tell us about the state of the business cycle.
The practical relevance of any information contained in the term structure is
ultimately an empirical question. When bond markets are noisy, observing the
term structure is not very informative. In order to quantify the informational
content of the term structure, the variances of the non-fundamental shocks in the
term structure are estimated simultaneously with the structural parameters of the
macroeconomy. The estimation methodology is similar to recent work by H¨ ordahl,
Tristani and Vestin (2006) who estimate the term structure dynamics jointly with
a small empirical macro model where the central bank is assumed to be perfectly
informed. H¨ ordahl et al impose only a no-arbitrage condition on the pricing of
bonds while in this paper the bond pricing function and the dynamics of the
macroeconomy are derived from the same underlying utility function. This makes
1 For example, Harvey (1988), Mishkin (1990) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998).4
the analysis more stringent, but it comes at the cost of an empirically less ﬂexible
bond pricing function.
In the next section a model is presented where the central bank extracts
information from the term structure about unobservable shocks while recognising
that its own actions inﬂuence the term structure itself. In Section 3 the model is
estimated to quantify the importance of the yield curve as a source of information.
Section 4 concludes.
2. The Macroeconomy, the Term Structure and Monetary
Policy Under Imperfect Information
This section presents a model where the central bank extracts information about
the state of the economy from the term structure of interest rates. Movements in
the term structure will then have a direct impact on the macroeconomy through
its effect on the central bank’s estimate of the state and therefore also on the
setting of the policy instrument. This means that the macroeconomy, the term
structure model and the ﬁltering problem of the central bank have to be solved
simultaneously. This makes the model different from other recent papers, for
example H¨ ordahl et al (2006) and Wu (2002), where the macroeconomic model
can be solved separately from the term structure. Here, the macroeconomy is
described ﬁrst without specifying an explicit interest rate function, but merely
noting that it is set by the central bank to minimise a loss function that in principle
could be derived from micro foundations. The ﬁltering problem of the central
bank is then solved, taking the term structure model as given. Finally, in the last
part the term structure model is derived and it is demonstrated how it inﬂuences
the dynamics of the macroeconomy through an information channel.
2.1 The Macroeconomy
We use a standard business cycle model of the macroeconomy with
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that sell differentiated goods. Prices are set
according to the Calvo mechanism, with a fraction of ﬁrms using a rule of thumb
rather than optimising as in Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999). Households supply labour
and consume goods. In addition to their own current consumption, they also care
about the lagged aggregate consumption level.5
2.1.1 Households and ﬁrms
Consider a representative household j ∈ (0,1) that wishes to maximise the












where β ∈(0,1) is the household’s subjective discount factor and the period utility
















Ct−1(j) d j (3)
is a reference level of consumption that we interpret as external habits that
makes marginal utility of consumption an increasing function of lagged aggregate
consumption. The habit speciﬁcation helps to explain the inertial movement of
aggregate output as well as the procyclicality of asset prices.2 Differentiated goods
indexed by i ∈ (0,1) are produced with a technology that is linear in labour and
subject to a persistent productivity shock At
Yt(i) = AtN(i) (4)













Firms set prices according to the Calvo (1983) mechanism where a fraction θ of
ﬁrms reset their price in a given period. Of the ﬁrms resetting their price, a fraction
(1−ω) optimise their price decision and take into account that their price may be
effective for more than one period while a fraction ω of price-setters use a ‘rule
of thumb’ as in Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999). The ‘rule of thumb’ price-setters set their
price equal to the last period’s average reset price plus the lagged inﬂation rate.
2 See Campbell and Cochrane (1999) for the implications of habits for asset prices.6
2.1.2 The linearised model








πt = µπ fEtπt+1+µπbπt−1+κmct +ε
π
t (8)
where {yt,πt,it} is real output, inﬂation and the short nominal interest rate in




are derived from the utility
function (2) and the parameters in the price-setting equation are speciﬁed in the
Appendix. Marginal cost in period t, mct, can be found by equating the marginal
utility of consuming the real wage paid for an additional unit of labour with the
household’s disutility of providing the additional unit of labour. The real marginal
cost then equals the market-clearing real wage divided by productivity
mct = (ϕ +γ)yt +η(1−γ)yt−1−(1+ϕ)at (9)
where the relationship
nt = yt −at (10)
was used to substitute out labour supply. Potential output, yt, deﬁned as the level
























The weights λy and λi can be chosen such that the loss function (12) is a second-
order approximation of the utility function of the representative agent.3 However,
we do not necessarily want to impose this restriction when we estimate the model.

































2.2 Monetary Policy and Real-time Signal Extraction
Monetary policy operates in an uncertain environment where some state variables
are only observed with error and delay, and some variables, like productivity and
thus potential output, are not observed at all. Variables that are not observable
but relevant for monetary policy have to be inferred from the variables that are
observable. In such a setting, Svensson and Woodford (2004) show that a form of
certainty equivalence holds. That is, with a quadratic objective function and linear
constraints, the optimal interest rate can be expressed as a linear function of the





where It is the information set of the central bank at time t. The coefﬁcients in
the policy function are then the same as they would be if the central bank could
observe the pre-determined state perfectly. The coefﬁcient vector F of the optimal
interest function
it = FX1,t|t (17)
can thus be found by standard full-information methods, for instance by the
algorithm in S¨ oderlind (1999). Here we describe how the central bank can apply
the Kalman ﬁlter to estimate the state X1,t. The afﬁne function that maps the
pre-determined state into bond prices, characterised by the matrices Q1 and Q2,
is taken as given and deriving the equilibrium dynamics of the model is then a
straightforward application of the procedure in Svensson and Woodford (2004).
Partition the coefﬁcient matrices in (13) conformably to the pre-determined and



















The equilibrium dynamics of the model can then be described by Equations
(19)–(23)













Zt = z+L1X1,t +L2X1,t|t +vt (22)
Yt = q+Q1X1,t +Q2X1,t|t +v
Y
t (23)
where Zt is the vector of variables that are observable to the central bank and Yt is
a vector of bond yields of different maturities. The system of Equations (19)–(23)
can be written solely as functions of the actual state, the central bank’s estimate
of the state and the shock vectors εt and vt. The coefﬁcient matrices G and G
1 are









where the following deﬁnitions were used
H ≡ A11+A12G
1 (26)









































and Svv is the covariance matrix of the errors in
the measurement Equation (22). The coefﬁcient matrices G, G
1, the Kalman gain
K and the one-period forecast error P have to be determined jointly by ﬁnding
a ﬁxed point of the system described by the Equations (24), (25), (28) and (29).
Before we can solve for the equilibrium dynamics we need to specify the selection
matrices L1and L2 in the observation Equation (22). We thus have to decide what
the central bank can observe.9
2.2.1 Variables observable by the central bank
The central bank observes bond yields contemporaneously, while output and
inﬂation are only observable with a one-period lag. This is a compromise that
is necessary due to the division of time into discrete periods that do not conform
to the exact delays of data releases, though it does capture some essential features
of data availability. Data on real GDP are released with a signiﬁcant delay while
bond prices are observed every day that bonds are traded. The compromise is
the observation of the price level. CPI data are usually released the month after
observation so the one-quarter lag is thus too long for most countries.4 We can






































A,B,C,Q1,Q2,Sεε,Svv,Zt−s | s ≥ 0
	
(34)
that is, in addition to observing the vector Zt, the central bank also knows the
structure of the economy.
2.3 The Law of Motion for the State of the Economy
In full-information models, the relevant state for the pricing of bonds is simply the
same as the state of the economy. In the present model the central bank cannot
observe the state of the economy with certainty and uses the Kalman ﬁlter to
estimate it. The central bank’s information set is a subset of the information set
of the bond market participants. This assumption allows us to model bond market
4 One exception is Australia, where data on the CPI are collected quarterly.10
participants as if they know the central bank’s estimate of the state. We deﬁne the













Yt = q+QXt +v
Y
t (37)
that is, we conjecture that yields are an afﬁne function of the extended state plus
a noise term v
Y
t . We start by substituting the observation Equation (22) into the
central bank’s, updating Equation (21) to get
X1,t|t = X1,t|t−1+K
h
L1X1,t +L2X1,t|t +vt −L1X1,t|t−1−L2X1,t|t
i
(38)
Using Equations (19)–(21), deﬁnitions (26) and (27) and rearranging them, we get
X1,t|t = [(H +J)+KL1J−KL1(H +J)]X1,t−1|t−1 (39)
+KL1HX1,t−1+Kvt +KL1εt
The matrices K, L1 and L2 depend on the coefﬁcients in the conjectured term
structure function (23) and the covariance matrix of measurement errors/non-
macro factors v
Y
t denoted by S
Y Y
vv . Combining Equations (19) and (39) we get
















2.4 The Term Structure and the State of the Economy
In this section we derive the law of motion for the nominal stochastic discount
factor that is used to price the bonds from the utility function of the representative
household. However, the framework presented here is general enough to
accommodate any afﬁne asset-pricing function and it is thus not necessary to
impose that the macro model and the bond pricing function are determined by11






whereUct is the marginal utility of consumption in period t. If we assume that the











Plugging in the utility function (2) into (41) and (43) we get
Et e mt+1 = −γEtct+1+(γ −η +γη)ct +η(1−γ)ct−1−Etπt+1 (44)
where e m denotes the deviation of m from its mean. Using that in equilibrium
Et e mt+1+it = 0 (45)
must hold and that the interest rate it is a function of the state Xt






we get the following simple expression for the the expected value of mt+1











































Bn = −F +M
0Bn−1 (53)
starting from
A1 = −i (54)
B1 = −F
0 (55)
where i is the average short interest rate. To ﬁnd the vector of yields of selected
























where the yield of an n periods to maturity bond is found by dividing the price by
n. Partitioning the stacked vectors −1








Equation (57) has a dual interpretation. On one hand it can be used to express bond
yields as a function of the state and the vector of shocks to the term structure, v
Y
t ,
are then residuals, i.e., the component of the yields that cannot be explained by the
state. A small variance of v
Y
t should then be interpreted as that the term structure
model provides a good ﬁt of the observed yields. Equation (57) can also be viewed
as a measure equation of the state. The vector of shocks v
Y
t are then measurement
errors and when the variance of v
Y
t is small, the signal-to-noise ratio is high and
the term structure is very informative about the state of the economy. In the special
case of the rank of Q1 being equal to the dimension of the state and S
Y Y
vv = 0, the
model replicates the full-information dynamics, since the state can then be backed
out perfectly from the term structure. In the opposite case, when the variances of
S
Y Y
vv are very large, the model will replicate the dynamics when the central bank
can only observe imperfect but direct measures of the lagged aggregate variables.13
3. The Dynamics of the Estimated Model
The dynamic implications of allowing the central bank to extract information from
the term structure depend on the magnitude of the noise in the bond market. There
is little information in the term structure when bond prices are very noisy, and
including it in the information set of the central bank then has little effect on
the dynamics of inﬂation and output. It is therefore of interest to quantify the
variances in the model. The parameters of the model are estimated by Bayesian
methods using quarterly data for the US ranging from 1982:Q1 to 2005:Q4 and
for Australia ranging from 1993:Q1 to 2005:Q3. The shorter sample period for
Australia is motivated by the fact that Australia experienced a large downward
shift in the level of inﬂation in the early 1990s. Preliminary estimations suggest
that including this shift in the sample may bias the results. First, it makes the
estimates more sensitive to the detrending method used. Second, including a
non-typical period when inﬂation is brought down by contractionary monetary
policy may bias the estimates of the preference parameters of the Reserve Bank
of Australia (RBA) to make it appear more averse to inﬂation volatility than is
actually the case.
The interest rates included are the Federal Funds rate and secondary market rates
for 6- and 12-month Treasury bills for the US, and the cash rate and the 180-day
bank bill rate and the 12-month Treasury bond rate for Australia. For both the US
and Australia, non-farm real GDP and CPI (excluding food and energy) are used
as a measure of output and to calculate quarterly inﬂation rates. The data were de-
trended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter and the ﬁrst eight observations were used
as a convergence sample for the Kalman ﬁlter. The prior modes, distributions and
estimated posteriors are reported in Table 1 together with the prior L(b Q) and the
likelihood conditional on the data set Z, L(b Q | Z). The Appendix contains more
details on the estimation procedure.
The posterior estimates for the structural parameters governing the behaviour of
households and ﬁrms are similar across the US and Australia.The higher estimated
value of λi indicates that the RBA seems to be smoothing interest rates more than
the Federal Reserve.
The measurement error in the short-term interest rate is bounded between zero
and 1/100 of the variance of the short interest rate, reﬂecting that this is a precise
measure of the policy instrument. The prior distribution of the variance of all other14
Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Para- Prior Prior Distribution Posterior s.e. Posterior s.e.
meter mode s.e. US Australia
γ 3 0.32 normal 3.43 0.24 3.03 0.22
ϕ 10 1.41 normal 8.49 0.08 9.65 0.18
η 1 0.32 normal 0.90 0.04 0.89 0.08
θ 0.75 0.11 beta 0.93 0.06 0.80 0.04
ω 0.3 0.03 beta 0.41 0.01 0.35 0.03
β 0.99 0.02 beta 1.00 0.012 0.99 0.10
ρ 0.8 0.28 beta 0.82 0.007 0.92 0.11
λy 0.5 0.32 normal 0.40 0.03 0.45 0.09



















































































































































L(b Q) 14.3 8.9
L(Z | b Q) 1 915.5 848.2
L(b Q | Z) 1 929.8 857.215
measurement errors are normal, with means equal to 1/5 of the variance of the
corresponding data series. We have two sets of measurement errors on output and
inﬂation. The measurement errors in the theoretical model capture the variance of





vπcb. The second set, which are the econometric measurement
errors, corresponds to the measurement errors in the data series that are used to




vπ and their estimated values
are discussed in Section 3.2 in the context of the overall ﬁt of the model. The
posteriorestimatesofthemodelmeasurementerrorsonlaggedoutputandinﬂation
aswellasthenon-fundamentalshocksinthetermstructure,arelargerforAustralia
than for the US, and the consequences of this are analysed in the next section.
3.1 Impulse Responses and the Role of Term Structure Information
Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the impulse responses of output, inﬂation and the
short interest rate for the US and Australia to productivity, demand and cost-push
shocks.
In the US, the short interest rate responds more to the shocks in the impact period
than in Australia. Part of this difference can be explained by differences in the
informational content of the term structure in the two economies. In Figure 3
the impulse responses to the same shocks as above are plotted for Australia, but
with no noise in the term structure. The Australian central bank then has more
accurate information and we can see that the responses to shocks are much larger
in the impact period. Output now immediately increases in response to a positive
productivity shock since short rates fall by more. The Australian central bank can
then also counter a cost-push shock by lowering demand already in the impact
period.
The analysis above emphasises the beneﬁcial aspects of responding to the term
structure, but since the term structure is noisy, this means that sometimes the
central bank will inadvertently respond to non-fundamental shocks. The responses
of output, inﬂation and the short interest rate in the US and Australia to a unit non-
fundamental shock to the 1-year bond rate are plotted in Figure 4.
The short interest rate in both the US and Australia increases in response to the
non-fundamental shock in the 1-year interest rate, leading to a fall in both output
and inﬂation.The response is quite small for both countries, with a 100 basis point16








































increase in the 1-year yield resulting in an increase of approximately 3 basis points
in the short rate. The increase in the short rate leads to lower output and inﬂation.
3.2 The Fit of the Model
In order to assess the ﬁt of the model, we can look at the estimated variances
of the errors in the empirical measurement equation. Table 2 reports the ratio
of the variance of the measurement errors in the observation over the variance
of the corresponding variable for both the US and Australia. A large value
indicates that the model is not very good at explaining the movements of the
corresponding observed variable, since that means that a large portion of the
variance of the variable does not conform to the model’s dynamic and cross-
equational implications. In general, the ﬁt of the model is worse for Australia than
for the US. There may be several explanations for this ﬁnding. First, Australia is a17






































small, open economy while the US is a large and relatively more closed economy.
This means that the baseline closed-economy New-Keynesian model employed
here may be too simple to capture the dynamics of the Australian economy. The
Australian economy is likely to be more affected by terms of trade shocks and
shocksthataffectcapitalﬂowsandtheexchangerate.Asfarastheresponsesofthe
endogenous variables to these types of disturbances are not nested in the demand,
cost-push and productivity shocks of the model, this will reduce the ﬁt. Another
possible explanation, at least for the worse ﬁt of long interest rates, is that the
Australian bond market is not as deep as the US bond market. With fewer traders
active, the market may be less efﬁcient at aggregating dispersed information.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the actual data series and the model’s ﬁtted series of the
observable endogenous variables. The model does a good job at tracking output,
inﬂation, the short interest rate and the 6-month yield in the US, but has problems18
Figure 3: Impulse Response of Australian Estimates with No Noise
































matching the volatility of the 1-year yield. The dual of the model’s inability to
match the long rate is that the long rate does not provide a lot of information
about the underlying state of the model. The ﬁt of the model is overall worse for
Australia.
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3.3 Variance Decomposition
The estimated model can be used to decompose historical variances of the
endogenous variables into their exogenous sources. Table 3 reports the results of
this exercise. In the US, inﬂation variance is driven almost entirely by cost-push
shocks. The two main sources of ﬂuctuations in output are productivity shocks
and non-fundamental shocks to the 6-month bond rate, with respective shares of
77 per cent and 19 per cent. The proportion of variation attributed to non-
fundamental sources may seem large. The present model attributes monetary
policy shocks, that is, non-systematic movements in the interest rates to
misconceptions about the state of the economy on behalf of the central
bank, and thus gives a clear interpretation of the policy shock. From this
perspective, 19 per cent is comparable to that found by other studies, where
the central bank is assumed to be perfectly informed (for example Smets
and Wouters 2004). That the ‘policy shocks’ appear to come from the bond
market suggests that the misconceptions about the state of the economy may
have been shared by the bond market participants. More than half of the
variance of the US policy instrument is in response to productivity and demand
shocks. That demand shocks explain only a small fraction of inﬂation and20








































output variation suggests that these responses have been quite successful. About
20 per cent of the interest rate variance is explained by the non-fundamental
shock to the 6-month interest rate. The instrument is the channel through which
these shocks feed into the economy, and it may appear as if responding to these
shocks is not optimal. However, since the central bank is assumed to respond with
statistically optimal weights to movements in the term structure, the beneﬁts of
having more accurate estimates of the state, on average, outweighs the cost of
occasionally responding to ‘false alarms’.
The variance decomposition for Australia has a quite different pattern.
Productivity shocks seem to play a very limited role for output, inﬂation and
interest rate variances. A large portion of output-gap variance (75 per cent) is
driven by demand shocks, and they also explain about a third of the variance
of the short interest rate. Inﬂation is almost entirely explained by cost-push
shocks. Central bank misconceptions of the inﬂation rate explains 10 per cent21










































of the short interest-rate variance while noise in the 6-month rate explains about
17 per cent. The responses of monetary policy to these non-fundamental shocks in
turn explains 10 per cent of the variance of output.



















yt 0.77 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.19 0
πt 0.10 0.03 0.84 0 0.02 0 0.01 0
it 0.35 0.42 0 0 0 0 0.20 0
Australia
yt 0.01 0.75 0.10 0.01 0.03 0 0.10 0
πt 0.02 0.01 0.94 0 0.02 0 0.01 0
it 0.02 0.32 0.35 0.03 0.10 0 0.17 0.0122
3.4 Robustness
In the baseline estimation above it was assumed that the central banks had an
explicit interest rate smoothing objective. An alternative explanation of inertial
interest rate changes is that central banks move slowly because they want to
accumulate more information before they move. The model was re-estimated after
imposing no interest rate smoothing, that is, by setting λi = 0. This leads to large
reductions in the posterior probabilities for both the US and Australia, and the
corresponding posterior odds ratios do not support the hypothesis that λi = 0.5
In the estimation, it was also imposed that the central banks of both the US and
Australia used the information in the term structure to set policy. If this assumption
is incorrect, it would bias the estimates of the noise in the term structure upwards.
The log likelihood for both the US and Australia decreases slightly when we re-
estimate the model without assuming that the central banks use the information in
the term structure. The change for the US is slightly larger, probably because the
assumption that the central bank observes the term structure should make less of
a difference for Australia where the term structure is relatively more noisy.
4. Conclusions
This paper has presented a general equilibrium model of monetary policy where
the central bank operates in an uncertain environment and uses information
contained in the term structure to estimate the underlying state of the economy
more efﬁciently. This set-up creates a link between the term structure and the
macroeconomy that is novel to the literature. A movement in the term structure
signals that a change in the short-term interest rate set by the central bank
may be desirable, which when implemented, in turn affects aggregate demand.
S¨ oderlind and Svensson (1997) warn that ‘central banks should not react
mechanically to [market expectations]’ since this may lead to a situation of ‘the
centralbankchasingthemarket,andthemarketsimultaneouslychasingthecentral
bank’. This argument is formalised in Bernanke and Woodford (1997) where
the authors show that if central banks react to market expectations, a situation
with a multiplicity of equilibria or where no equilibrium exists may arise. In this
5 More details on posterior mode estimates and likelihoods for the alternative speciﬁcations are
available from the author upon request.23
paper we have argued that there may be beneﬁts from systematic reactions to
market expectations, but with some important qualiﬁcations. The non-existence
of equilibria arises in the model of Bernanke and Woodford because the central
bank can extract the underlying state perfectly from observing the expectations
of the private sector. Inﬂation will thus always be on target. But if inﬂation is
always on target and private agents only care about accurate inﬂation forecasts,
there is no incentive for the private sector to pay a cost to be informed about
the underlying shock, and observing expectations will not reveal any information.
The model here differs because, to the extent that there is noise in the bond
market, the central bank cannot extract the underlying shock perfectly. Thus there
will always exist a cost of information-gathering that is small enough to make
it proﬁtable for the private sector to acquire information about the underlying
shock, even if private agents only cared about having accurate inﬂation forecasts.
Additionally,inthismodeltheforecastingproblemofprivateagentsinvolvesmore
than accurately forecasting inﬂation, since bond prices depend on real factors
through the stochastic discount factor as well as the price level. Insofar as the real
discount factor is affected by the underlying state, agents will have an incentive to
collect information about it, regardless of the behaviour of inﬂation.
Ultimately,theinformationalcontentofthetermstructureisanempiricalquestion.
The model presented here provides a coherent framework within which any
information about the state of the economy that is contained in the term structure
can be quantiﬁed in a general equilibrium setting. The model explicitly takes into
account that the central bank may use the information in the term structure to set
policy and therefore inﬂuences what it observes. The model was estimated on US
and Australian data using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that
there is some information in the US term structure that allows the Federal Reserve
to respond to shocks in a timely manner, while the Australian term structure
appears to be more noisy and less informative for the monetary policy process.
This difference may be explained by the fact that Australia is a small and relatively
open economy, and hence difﬁcult to represent using a closed-economy model.24
Appendix A: The Model























































where the coefﬁcient matrices A, B and C are given by
A = A
−1
0 A1, B = A
−1




















1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 µyf φ





























ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0




















































































To compute the likelihood of the model, we follow the method of Hansen and































where b Zt is the vector of variables that are observable (to us as econometricians)
and S
ZZ
vv is the covariance matrix of the econometric measurement errors on
output and inﬂation. Construct the innovation series {ut}
T
t=0 from the innovation
representation
b Xt+1 = b µ +Mb Xt +Kut (A14)
b Zt = Db Xt +ut (A15)
by rearranging to
ut = b Zt −Db Xt (A16)
b Xt = b µ +Mb Xt−1+Kut (A17)











The log likelihood L(b Z | Q) of observing the data Z for a given set of parameters














The posterior mode b Q is then given by
b Q = argmaxL(Q)+L(Z | Q) (A22)
where L(Q) denotes the log of the prior likelihood of the parameters Q. The
posterior mode was found using Bill Goffe’s simulated annealing minimiser
(available at <http://cook.rfe.org/>). The posterior standard errors was calculated
using Gary Koop’s Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings distribution simulator
(available at <http://www.wiley.co.uk/koopbayesian>).28
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